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FSINFATC FOR FSI/LMS/CMT - JOHN HARALSON
STATE FOR S/ES-O/CMS
WHA/EX
WHA/CAR

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [AMER](#) [CASC](#) [ASEC](#) [AFSI](#) [KCOM](#) [OTRA](#) [KESS](#) [JM](#)
SUBJECT: KINGSTON: LESSONS LEARNED - CRISIS MANAGEMENT
EXERCISE (CME)

REF: DIR FSINFATC 2/7/2007

11. The following is keyed to Para 2, A-H, Reftel:

(A) Almost all participants consider the form and conduct of the exercise to have been outstanding, and four hours to have been sufficient to meet the objectives. Understandably, some participants (RSO and CONS) would have welcomed the opportunity to fully play out in detail post's responses in certain of the scenarios, e.g., to have staged real time simulations involving family members actually conducting evacuation drills or working with offices of the Government of Jamaica (GoJ) in responding to an aircraft crash. However, post recognizes that the CME is designed as a table-top exercise.

(B) Without exception, participants consider all of the scenarios played during the exercise to have been extremely valuable. Some participants believe that the number and rapidity of scenarios might be reduced to more realistic dimensions; however, all the scenarios were entirely plausible and quite useful.

(C) Participants consider the intervention by the controller to have been just about right*- limited in frequency and duration, but insightful and quite useful.

(D) The CME did not lead to any radical changes in post's approach or overall ability to deal with various possible crises; however, as a result of CME post would be better prepared, in general.

(E) Post has taken a number of lessons and best practices for crisis management from the CME:

-- Having recently moved to its New Embassy Compound (NEC), post now needs to move forward as expeditiously as feasible with plans to install computers, telephones, and audio-visual equipment in the multi-purpose room in which the CME was staged, so that it can function effectively as a crisis control room. Post also must address questions about possible alternate crisis control centers.

-- Post should establish a mobile communications system as soon as feasible.

-- Tripwires and policy on allowing AmCits inside chancery walls in emergency scenarios must be more clearly defined.

(F) All participants found the stand-alone CMT Overview to have been extremely useful; indeed, some considered it the

most valuable portion of the entire CME. CONS/ACS would have preferred a lengthier stand-alone session more closely resembling the CME, while RSO would have preferred several mini-stand-alone sessions with actual simulations of crisis scenarios. However, post recognizes that the CME is designed as a table-top exercise with constraints on time and resources.

(G) Most participants considered the optimal frequency of CMEs for Kingston to be once every two years (present schedule). One participant suggested that, to allow for variations in personnel rotations, changing threat levels, and/or specific events, CMEs be held at post's request; another suggested multiple mini-CMEs held quarterly. However, post recognizes the constraints of time, funding, and resources.

(H) Without exception, participants felt that the CME had been a valuable and instructive experience. Post appreciates CMT's detailed planning and professional conduct of a highly successful CME in Kingston.

JOHNSON